Theoretically advanced sciences such as physics and biolo~y have developed two complementary and Beld-ernbracmg epis temologies or frameworks for the pursuit of scientific under standing. One, the tmpirical f'pistemology. aims to test theories and develop a reliable body of facts and ",a)·world appllcanons, whereas the other. the ratumalrJ'istrmoloi:Y' aims to create and develop theories for explainmg available facts, faeilitatin~ prole tical applications. and predicting new facts for future testlng, Both epistemologies arc relevant to the recent psi controversy. which represents much more than I personality difference between "theory-trusting" versus "data-trusting" scientists (Child 1987; see also Rao lie Palmer 1987; henceforth R lie Pl. Both sides of the psi debate. however. have implicitly adopted the empirical cpistemol(llZlJ, without spdlinjt out or systemat ically applyinjt the rational epistemology. As a result. many dimensions of the pro-psi argument remain unchallenged, and the two sides often fail to make contact. attaching fundamentally different implications to seemingly straightforward terms such as psi, theory. facts. reliability. and practical applications (see below). I will argue that developing the rational epistemology in both psychology and parapsychology represents another pre requisite for admiUin~ psi into mainstream science.
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F.cts under the two .p/stemologles. Under the empirical epistemology observations speak for themselves, whereas un der the rational epistemology, observations only become really secure and unimpeachable when explained by a theory, and often do not count as scientific facts until a plausible theoretical mechanism for explaining them is proposed. An example is mid nineteenth century bioloJtY. which refused to accept the large body of well-known and reliable observations on selective breeding as scientific fact until Darwfn proposed a plausible theory for explaining these observations, Psi likewise falls out side the realm of psychological fact under the rational epis temology because no plausible theoretical mechanism for explaining psi data has been proposed. and not because these data are unreliable or fraudulent (empirical epistemology arguments). 
Continuing Commentary
P (po 539) use psi as an empirical term referring to, for example, alleged observations that "subjects can acquire information that is shielded from the senses," R lie P present no mechanism and no theory; they remain noncommittal on metatheoretical frame works sucb as dualism and materialism. in which a theory could conceivably be developed, and they ignore theoretical sug gestions such as psi waves as well as detailed theoretical chal lenges for unborn theories ofpsi noted by Beyerstein (1987) and others.
Under the rational epistemology, empirical terms are funda mentally different from theoretical terms such as nodes (Mac Kay, 1982; 1987) and hidden units (McClelland et al. 1986 ), which originate as inventions. Hypothetical interactions (e.g., altered linkage strength) between such inventions purport to describe how things (e.g., mfnds) universally and inevitably work for aU time, space, and hypothetical or GedlJnken eram pies, and the behavior ofthese presumptive constructs must be compatible in principle with all prior and future knowledge (theoretical laws) within this hypothetical domain. Such theo ries are applied to empirical phenomena only later and only indirectly through rules of correspondence and through the logic of how their theoretical constructs interact (see MacKay 1988).
Like empirical epistemologists in general, R lie P "are not oblivious to the importance of theory testing" (p. 624). How ever, they clearly underestimate how difficult it is to create and modify theories of the rationalist type. It is not enough to imagine that a demonstration of psi would entail unspecified revisions or restrictions of the applicability of already estab lished theories. Nor is it enough to hope for the epistemolog ically impossible and the historically unprecedented, that some predictive and internally consistent psi theory might be devel oped that is incommensurable \\ith established theories and somehow applies to nonoverlapping therapeutical and observa tional domains (p. 625). Nor is it enough to imagine that someday a larger theory capable of explaining parapsychological as well as conventional data might subsume current theories, much as relativity subsumed Newtonian mechanics. What is required for complete acceptance of psi under the rational epistemology is to create in (paralpsychology the equivalent of both Newtonian mechanics and relativity.
Much more is required than speculative thinking, something that in parapsychology "has been rampant, even wild. on occa sions" (Rao 1977, p. 295 ). More also is required than "tentative and exploratory hypotheses, often no more than descriptions" (Rao 1977, p. 344), or vague metaphors such as Rao's (p. 346), "we are habitually and constitutionally given to respond to and interact with our environment rather than probe within to discover hidden knowledge." This last point is relevant to R lie P's commendable desire for rapprochement between cognitive psychology and parapsychology. It is not enough simply to point to the unsolved problem of selective attention underlying the hypothetical reception of a "signal" among indefinitely many other signals from indefinitely many past, present, or future "sources" from indefinitely near or far. Nor is it enough to suggest that an ESP signal "may compete for the information processing resources of the organism" and "fits well with con cepts that are widely accepted in cognitive psychology and information-p"rocessing theory". Although perhaps widely ac cepted a decade ago, the concept offlxed-processing resources is no longer widely accepted (see e. g., the empirical criticisms of theoretical laws in other fields, such as physics and biophysics, that also require integration with the psi hypothesis.
ObNriaUon. and theoretical con..",aUam. Under the ra tional epistemology, conservatism with regard to established theory is highly desirable and applicable in the case of psi. Even replicable data that fail to fit established theory do not and should not necessarily call for theoretical modifications (see MacKay 1988) . Practical applatJon•. The expectation of a direct relationship between experiments and practical applications, is a recurrent assumption in both the psi controversy and the empirical epis temology: If only psi could be reliably demonstrated, it would have nontrivial applications. according 'to R lie P and others.
However, no such direct relationship exists between experi mental findings and sophisticated applications under the ra tional epistemology. The very fact that laboratory observations originate in rigidly controlled and (one hopes) well-understood situations restricts the applicability of these observations to real world problems where this control is by definition unavailable. Sophisticated applications derive from theories rather than from experiments per se, which are "fragile" and lack characteristics such as flexibility, simplicity, hypotheticality, and generality that enable application to unknown or uncontrolled conditions.
Price (1949, p. 20) presented an early summary of the status of psi that still rings true in the rational epistemology:
The theoretical side of psychical research has laged far behind the evidentialside.....o\nd that I believeis one ofthe reasons whl' the evidenceis stillignoR'd by 10 many.... highly educated people. It is because these queer facts apparently "make no sense" ... that they tend to makenoimpression on the mind. . . . Ifwecoulddevise some theoretical expLutalien in terms of which the l'acts did make sense ... it would be ill great gain. Suchan explanalion is neededfor its own sake,and it is alsoneeded toget the evidenceattended toand considered. (excerpts as per Mundie 1976) Contrary to R lie P's suggestion (p. 624), neither MundIe (1976) nor others have successfully contested Price's point. Mundie actually echoes Price's concern over the absence in parapsychol ogy not just of viable theories. but of metatheoretical frame worksfor discussing the "queer facts" of parapsychology. How ever, Mundie adopts the empirical epistemology in suggesting that these strange but firmly established facts should "be al lowed to speak for themselves" (p. 97), and Mundie's recom mendation for the field (p. 96) only makes sense in the empirical epistemology: that parapsychology should avoid theories al together because any conceivable theory that could explain parapsychological data would be so absurd as to alienate scien tists whose expertise is essential for conducting further para psychological experiments. (See also Edge 1976, p. 8) . This recommendation is a counterproductive non sequitur under the rational epistemology where the goal is to create theories and where facts do not speak for themselves.
Like Mundie and Price, the two sides of the psi debate have resembled epistemological ships passing in the empirical night. Things as big as field-embracing epistemologies can pass with out contact because both sides use the same terms with different implications. The night is empirical because neither side has stepped completely outside the empirical epistemology. Devel oping the rational epistemology along with the empirical epis temology is essential for both psychology and parapsychology alike. Ifconfined to the empirical epistemology, the psi contro versy and the empirical night will contiaue indefinitely.
